Case Law and Cites
VII. LAWS BURDENING INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ARE VOID
See
Kassel v Consolidated Freightways,
450 US 662; 101 S Ct 1309; 67 L Ed 2d 580 (1981) rejecting the story that 55
feet double-trailer trucks are safer than 65 foot double-trailer trucks. The
Iowa Legislature had simply invented the claim that the extra 10 foot length
made all the difference! The Supreme Court struck down this invented number as
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. “Where a state statute
conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way.” U.S.
Const.,
Art. VI, cl. 2;
Maryland
v Louisiana,
451 US 725, 746; 101 S Ct 2114; 68 L Ed 2d 576 (1981). States cannot adopt laws
or regulations affecting interstate commerce without compelling factual
foundation to support said law or regulation.
"Personal liberty, which is
guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the
right to locomotion,—to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may
lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. . . .
"Any law
which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a
conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his
presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and
destroy all the rights which our Constitution guarantees." Pinkerton v
Verberg, 78 Mich 573, 584; 44 NW 579, 582-583 (1889). [See, e.g., the
Bill of Rights, especially the 9th
and 10th
Amendments.]
IX. SPEED LIMITS VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT TO TRAVEL"
Most people have heard of some of
our constitutional rights, the right to freedom of speech, press, religion,
vote, etc. But there is a also a lesser known right, but EQUAL in the eyes of
the law to those we know, the constitutional "right to travel."
Americans' "freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution," according to multiple cases including
Williams
v Fears,
179 US 270, 274; 21 S Ct 128; 45 L Ed 186 (1900);
Twining
v New Jersey,
211 US 78, 97; 29 S Ct 14; 53 L Ed 97 (1908), as listed in the case of
United States
v Guest,
383 US 745; 86 S Ct 1170; 16 L Ed 2d 239 (1968), a case involving criminally
prosecuting people for obstructing the right (obstruction is a federal crime
pursuant to federal criminal law
18 USC § 241).
Shapiro v
Thompson, 394
US 618 (1969), establishes that laws that interfere with "fundamental rights"
are "suspect" and demand "close scrutiny" by courts. Laws cannot simply be
passed on whimsy, but there must be a "compelling state interest." Any law that
would "chill" exercising a right is "patently unconstitutional." It is a
well-established right of the people
The charge against you is not evidence. Charges are
ex parte and do not support the presumption. See Jim Crockett Promotion,
Inc v City of Charlotte, 706 F2d 486, 490-491 (CA 4, 1983) (the
accusation was that the sound being made was "unnecessary" and above what was
allowed; allegations that something is above some maximum are not sufficient to
support a presumption!)
Constitutionally, "a criminal statutory presumption must
be regarded as `irrational' or `arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless
it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend."
Leary v
United States,
395 US 6, 36; 89 S Ct 1532; 23 L Ed 2d 57 (1966) (holding invalid a statutory
presumption that person found possessing marijuana had also imported the same).
XIV. YOU MUST BE PROPERLY
NOTIFIED BEFORE PLEADING
Before a person can constitutionally
plead guilty, the accused must be properly informed of the charge and elements.
Constitutionally, aspects of a criminal case require a defendant's knowing
participation. To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntarily made with full
knowledge of its implications.
Henderson
v Morgan,
426 US 637; 96 S Ct 2253; 49 L Ed 2d 108 (1976) (case involving defendant not
informed of the "intent" element of the crime of which accused).
Henderson relies on even older case law to show
that his "plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an
intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant
received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first
and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'"
Smith v
O'Grady, 312
U.S. 329, 334; 61 S Ct 572, 574; 85 L Ed 859 (1941). In law, "a guilty plea is
an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation
to the facts."
McCarthy v
United States,
394 US 459; 89 S Ct 1166; 22 L Ed 2d 418 (1969).
XV. THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The federal Constitution,
the Sixth Amendment,
guarantees the right to jury trial "in all criminal prosecutions." States have a
record of trying to undermine this right two ways: (a) by banning jury trials in
some criminal prosecutions, and (b) by cutting jury size down from twelve to
six. Such obstruction of the right to jury trial is supposed to be
unconstitutional, as the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to honor our
federal constitutional rights.
Federal law
18 USC § 241
bans obstructing federal rights, which includes the "right to travel," as per
the long line of
case law above
cited. It is not needed that the accused, whether a private citizen,
legislator, or officer, know the technical concepts involved, in order for there
to be a conviction, United States v Redwine, 715 F2d 315 (CA 7,
1983).
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time, even after disposition, and even collaterally. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) and 60(b)(4); Taubman Co v Webfeats, 319 F3d 770, 773 (CA 6, 2003).